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Comment
With Strings Attached: Federal Income Tax
Consequences to Donors of Conditional Gifts
I. INTRODUCTION
When a taxpayer gives a gift, the transaction is a taxable
event. Through section 2501 of the Internal Revenue Code, the
federal government imposes a tax on the donor of the gift,'
graduating the amount of tax paid from 18% to 70% of the value
of the gift.'
As expected, when the federal government imposes a tax, at-
tempts are made by those on whom the tax is laid to transfer the
tax burden or to avoid its payment altogether. Thus, early cases
reflect attempts by donors of gifts to transfer the tax burden to
the recipients by creating the gifts in trust and having the
trustees use the trust income to discharge the gift tax liability.'
However, using section 677 of the Internal Revenue Code,4 which
treats a grantor as the owner of any part of a trust that
distributes income to him, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
had successfully argued that the gift tax payment from the trust
income was ordinary income to the grantor and thus taxable.
To avoid such an application of section 677, donor-taxpayers
began to structure gift transactions so that the trustees paid the
1. I.R.C. § 2501. See also I.R.C. §§ 2502 and 2503. Section 2502(c) states:
"The tax imposed by section 2501 shall be paid by the donor." Section 2503(b)
allows the donor to give each donee up to $10,000 a year in gifts without the
imposition of any gift tax.
2. I.R.C. §§ 2502 and 2001. The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act, P.L.
97-34 has reduced the maximum gift and estate tax rates from 70% to 50%.
The rate reduction will be phased in from 1982 to 1985 so that in 1985 a 50%
tax rate will apply to all taxable gifts and bequests which exceed $2,500,000.
The reduced tax rate will apply to estates of decedents dying after, and gifts
made after, December 31, 1981.
3. See infra note 25.
4. I.R.C. § 677 states in part: "The grantor shall be treated as the owner
of any portion of a trust ... whose income . . . is ... (1) distributed to the gran-
tor .... "
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gift tax with money from a loan to the trust secured by the trust
corpus. The trust income was used to repay the loan in a later
year. The result was that the donor was held not to have received
any taxable income from the trust's payment of the gift tax or
repayment of the loan.'
Recently, two additional methods have been developed to cir-
cumvent the application of section 677. The first is simply by
conditioning the gift upon the donee's payment of all the gift
taxes.6 The second method, although a bit more complicated, ac-
complishes the same purpose. Using the intended gift as security,
the donor first obtains a loan equal to the amount of the gift tax
he would have to pay. The donor then establishes a trust with
the donee as beneficiary and the same gift property as the trust
corpus. Next, the trustee executes a note to the original lender
cancelling the donor's original loan using the same trust corpus
as collateral. Finally, the donor pays the gift tax with the loan
money and is free and clear of any debt, while the trustee pays
back the loan that was used to pay the gift tax.7
The issue that arises in these transactions is whether the
amount of the gift tax paid by the donee or trustee should be
considered part of the donor's taxable income to the extent that
the gift tax paid exceeds the donor's basis in the gift property.8
Federal circuits are split on the issue9 and have approached it in
5. See Estate of Annette S. Morgan, 37 T.C. 981 (1962), aff'd per curiam,
316 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963). In Morgan, the
taxpayer-donor transferred property to a trust and the trust took a bank loan
to pay the gift tax. When trust income was used to repay the loan, the Commis-
sioner claimed that under section 677, the repayment was income to the donor.
The Tax Court held that since the gift tax liability no longer existed, the repay-
ment of the loan could not be for the benefit of the donor, and thus there was
no income tax consequence to the donor.
6. See Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307 (1974), aff'd, 572 F.2d 427 (4th
Cir. 1978) (en banc); Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968), aff'd per
curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969).
7. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791 (1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1079
(6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
8. See I.R.C. § 61. Gross Income Defined. (a) "[G]ross income means all in-
come from whatever source derived .. " Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e) (1972) states
that "where a transfer of property is in part a sale and in part a gift, the
transferor has a gain to the extent that the amount realized by him exceeds his
adjusted basis in the property."
9. Even though the Internal Revenue Code is federal law and is to be ap-
plied uniformly, the Code is subject to varying interpretations. Because the
decisions of any one court of appeals are not binding on the other circuits, con-
flicting decisions may result.
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three basic ways: 1) some have examined the intent of the donor
in making the gift; 2) others have examined the extent to which
the donor has realized an economic benefit; 3) still another has
adopted a hybrid approach, combining elements of the first two.
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue.
Those federal courts that have rested their decision on a sub-
jective determination of the donor's intent in making the gift
have held that there are no income tax consequences to the
donor.' The analysis requires an examination of the facts sur-
rounding the transaction and a determination about whether the
donor intended the transaction to be a gift or a sale. If the donor
is found to have intended a gift, the entire transaction is
characterized as a net gift" and there are no income tax conse-
quences to him. If, however, the donor is found to have intended
to sell the property for an amount equal to the gift tax then
under the rationale termed part sale, part gift 2 there is income
to the donor equal to the amount of the gift tax due less the
donor's adjusted basis in the gift property.
Courts of appeals that have applied an economic benefit
analysis have concluded the donor has realized taxable income.'4
10. See Davis v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363 (1971), aff'd per
curiam, 469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1977); Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968),
aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969).
11. Under the net gift rationale, it is concluded that the donor intended to
make a gift equal to the total value of the transferred property less the amount
of the gift tax to be paid. Thus the donor does not realize any income. In addi-
tion, the amount of the gift tax to be paid is based on the' net gift. See Rev.
Rul. 75-72, 1975-1 C.B. 310; superseding Rev. Rul. 71-232, 1971-1 C.B. 275. See
also Pamela Lingo, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1954); Sarah H. Harrison, 17 T.C. 1350
(1952), acquiesced in, C.B. 2; infra note 25.
12. Under the part gift, part sale rationale, the amount realized from the
part of the transaction that is considered a sale, i.e., the gift tax amount, is tax-
able, while the remainder is a gift with no income tax consequences to the
donor.
13. For an additional discussion of the differences between the net gift and
part gift, part sale characterizations see Del Cotto, Sales and Other Disposi-
tions of Property Under Section 1001: The Taxable Event, Amount Realized
and Related Problems of Basis, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 219 (1976-77); Note, Income
Tax Consequences of Encumbered Gifts: The Advent of Crane, 28 U. FLA. L.
REV. 935 (1976); Note, Tax Consequences of Gifts Given With Strings Attached,
28 U. FLA. L. REV. 682 (1976); Note, Part Gift-Part Sale, Net Gift, and Gift of
Encumbered Property: Specialized Strategies for Gifts of Unique Property, 50
NOTRE DAME LAw. 880 (1975); 52 TEMP. L.Q. 139 (1979); 38 MD. L. REV. 110
(1978).
14. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 433 (1979), rev'd 643 F.2d
499 (8th Cir. 1981); Evangelista v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1057 (1979), affd, 629
Gifts
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This approach examines the facts of the transaction independently
of a donor's intent to determine whether there is any economic
gain or benefit to him. If a donor is found to have received an
economic benefit then there are potential income tax conse-
quences. Under this approach, the donor's benefit, if any, is in
the form of relief from a legal obligation to pay the gift tax and
is thus taxable. 5
The Fourth Circuit has developed a third approach, a hybrid
analysis" that first uses the intent rationale to determine if the
donor intends to make a gift or a sale of the property, 7 taking in-
to consideration the familial relationships between the giving
and receiving parties. 8 It also looks at the economic result of the
transaction to determine whether the donor has received any
type of economic benefit as a result of the donee paying all the
gift tax due. 9
This comment begins with a review of the cases that have
established these three basic approaches. It follows with an
analysis of the approaches and concludes that the economic
benefit thinking best reflects the underlying policies of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code and existing case law. As a result, when a
donee or trustee pays the gift tax, the donor receives an
economic benefit to the extent that the gift tax paid exceeds the
donor's adjusted basis. This amount, it is concluded, should be in-
cluded in the donor's taxable income.
II. FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS APPROACHES
A. Intent Test
The 1968 Tax Court decision in Turner v. Commissioner,"0
where the court first developed the intent approach, dealt with
F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1980); Levine v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 780 (1979), affd, 634
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791 (1973), aff'd, 495
F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
15. Apparently, through Turner and Johnson the Sixth Circuit has adopted
both approaches depending on the exact facts of the transaction.
16. Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307 (1974), aff'd, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.
1978) (en banc). See infra notes 59 through 76 and the accompanying text.
17. 572 F.2d at 430.
18. Id. at 431, 432.
19. Id. at 431.
20. 49 T.C. 356 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969).
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the income tax consequences to a donor resulting from a gift con-
ditioned upon the donee's payment of all federal and state gift
taxes. The donor made gifts of stock that had greatly ap-
preciated in value to six trustees and to three individual donees.
The three donees in turn personally obligated themselves to pay
the resulting gift tax and the six trustees obligated their respec-
tive trusts.2 Upon the donees' payment of the tax, the Commis-
sioner claimed that the transfer was a part gift, part sale trans-
action and that the donor had realized a long-term capital gain to
the extent that the gift tax paid exceeded the donor's adjusted
basis in the transferred property.'
Contrary to the Commissioner's argument, the Tax Court held
that where the donees pay the gift tax, the resulting transaction
is a net gift. Because it is a gift, there are no income tax conse-
quences to the donor." The Tax Court reasoned that the donor
did not intend to effect any type of transaction other than a gift
and the fact that the donees had to pay the gift tax did not
change the basic transaction." Finding no identical case law, the
court examined earlier decisions on the issue of payment of gift
tax by a trustee from trust income and concluded that the part
gift, part sale rationale advanced by the Commissioner was totally
inconsistent with these holdings. The condition imposed by the
donor on the donee did not alter the fact that the transfer was a
gift. 5 It is the substance of the transaction and not the form that
21. 49 T.C. at 358. The donor actually received checks from the transferees
for the computed share of the gift tax. It is unclear about whether the donor
paid the gift tax with these funds or whether she paid the gift tax first and
then kept the money she received. Id. at 358-59.
22. Id. at 360. The Commissioner conceded that the transfers to the trusts
were not sales based on the fact that the individual transferees were personally
liable to pay the gift tax while the trustees were not. Therefore the only issue
was whether the gift to the individuals was a part gift, part sale. Id. at 362-63.
If there was a sale, the gain would have been a long term capital gain because
the sold stock was a capital asset and the taxpayer had purchased the stock
over 47 years ago. See I.R.C. § 1223.
23. 49 T.C. at 364.
24. Id. at 363.
25. The earlier cases cited by the court centered around I.R.C. § 677. See
Estate of Craig R. Sheaffer, 37 T.C. 99 (1961), affd, 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963); Estate of A.E. Staley, Sr., 47 B.T.A. 260 (1942),
aff'd 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 786 (1943); Sarah Helen
Harrison, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952), acquiesced in, 1952-2 Cum. Bull 2; Pamela Lingo,
13 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1954).
In Staley, the taxpayer gave stock to a trust reserving the right to $150,000
Gifts
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is decisive. In its attempt to identify the substance of the trans-
action, the court looked at the relationship between the parties.
Here, the donor was making transfers to her children and grand-
children. In view of the close familial relationships, it was clear
to the court that the petitioner intended to make a gift.2"
As further support for its holding that the transaction con-
stituted a gift and as such meant no income tax consequences for
the donor, the Tax Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would
give the donee a double credit for the gift tax paid when com-
puting the donee's new basis for the gift. This is so because
under Treasury Regulation 1.1015-4 the basis of property in the
hands of the donee in a part gift, part sale transaction equals the
sum of the amount the donee pays for the property plus the
amount of the gift tax paid.27 The court concluded that a part
gift, part sale interpretation would allow the donee to credit the
same money twice: once as the amount paid for the property and
again as the gift tax paid. This result was unacceptable to the
court and was persuasive evidence that the part gift, part sale
characterization is inappropriate when the donee pays the
donor's gift tax. 8 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
of the trust income to pay the gift tax. Rejecting the taxpayer's claim of sale,
the Tax Court held that the taxpayer had retained an interest of $150,000 in
the trust and this amount was to be included as part of his taxable ordinary in-
come under section 166 of the 1934 Internal Revenue Code (now I.R.C. § 677). In
doing so, the court also rejected the Commissioner's characterization of the
transaction as part sale, part gift. 47 B.T.A. at 265.
In both Harrison and Lingo, the donor transferred property to a trust on the
condition that the trust would pay the resulting gift tax. Each case held that
the amount of the gift subject to gift tax was the gross gift amount less the
amount of the gift tax, and based its conclusion on the belief that by making
such a condition the donor intended to make a net gift. Harrison, 17 T.C. at
1356-57; Lingo, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) at 441.
In Sheaffer, the trustee of a trust paid the gift tax due on a transfer from the
donor partly out of trust income and partly from the proceeds of a loan obtained by
using the trust assets as security. The Tax Court held that under section 677,
the gift tax amount paid by the trustee was taxable to the donor to the extent
that the money came from the trust income. The trust income used to repay the
loan was not taxable to the donor. 37 T.C. at 105-06.
26. 49 T.C. at 363. The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's distinction
between the gift to the trustees and to the individual donees. The transfers
were substantively identical and therefore should be similarly characterized for
income tax purposes. Id.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4 (1963).
28. 49 T.C. at 363-64. For a discussion of the donee's new basis see infra
notes 77 & 79-81 and accompanying text.
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Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding.'
Depite Turner the Commissioner continued, unsuccessfully, to
advance the part gift, part sale argument in instances where the
gift tax was paid by the donee or the trustee after cancelling the
donor's loan obligation. For example, in both Estate of Annette
S. Morgan0 and in Krause v. Commissioner"1 the Tax Court
again rejected the part gift, part sale argument and adhered to
Turner as authority that a net gift transaction produced no in-
come tax consequence to the donor. The effect of this line of
cases is to allow the donor of a gift to avoid any tax conse-
quences arising from the donee paying the gift tax on the
transferred property.
B. Economic Benefit Approach
Undaunted by the Tax Court's continual rejection of the part
gift, part sale approach, the Commissioner continued to argue
that the net gift transaction results in taxable income to the
donor. However, the Commissioner gradually changed his line of
attack and instead started looking to the concept of gross in-
come. He argued that the net gift results in an economic benefit
to the donor and as such is includable as gross income. Five
years after Turner his perseverance paid off in the Sixth
Circuit's holding in Johnson v. Commissioner.2
In Johnson the taxpayer obtained a $200,000 non-recourse
loan' secured by 50,000 shares of appreciated stock worth over
$500,000. Two days later the taxpayer placed the pledged stock
29. Commissioner v. Turner, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969).
30. See supra note 5.
31. 56 T.C. 1242 (1971), appeal dismissed, (6th Cir. 1972). In Krause, the
trust-transferee accepted property subject to the trust paying the gift tax. The
tax was paid with money from a loan secured by the trust assets. The Tax
Court held that the donor realized income from the trust under section 677 only
to the extent the trust accumulated income prior to the actual payment of the
gift tax. Income realized after this date was not taxable to the donor under
Morgan. See supra note 5. The Tax Court also held there was no sale of income
interest. 56 T.C. at 1248.
32. 59 T.C. 791 (1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1040 (1974).
33. With a non-recourse loan, the recipient of the loan is not personally
liable for the proceeds. Rather the collateral for the loan is used to repay the
loan in instances of default. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 953 (rev. 5th ed.
1979).
1982] 469
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in trust for his children. The trustees of the trust then executed
a note with the original lender cancelling the taxpayer's debt and
opened a $200,000 debit account with the lender using the
$500,000 of appreciated stock as security. The taxpayer-grantor
then paid the $150,000 gift tax on the original $500,000 gift
transfer to the trust. Since he no longer was obligated to repay
the $200,000 loan, the taxpayer pocketed the remaining $50,000.
The Commissioner notified the taxpayers of a deficiency,
alledging that the taxpayers had realized a long-term capital gain
equal to the amount by which the original loan exceeded their
basis in the transferred stock.3 ' The taxpayers contested the
deficiency in the Tax Court claiming that they had realized no in-
come because the transfer was a net gift.36 The Tax Court re-
jected the taxpayers' claims, distinguishing Turner both on the
facts and on the law. 7 Finding that the transactions in Johnson
were in actuality a part gift, part sale, the court relied on the
United States Supreme Court decision in Crane v. Commis-
sioner' to hold that the taxpayer had shed his tax liability and
thus had realized taxable income to the extent that the original
loan exceeded the taxpayer's basis in the stock. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the Tax
Court's result but based its ruling on the new theory that the
taxpayer-grantor had received an economic benefit. Stating that
the Tax Court's finding of part gift, part sale merely asserted a
conclusion, the appellate court preferred instead to concentrate
34. 495 F.2d at 1080. Because there was no longer any obligation on the
original note, the taxpayer had $50,000 free and clear.
35. 59 T.C. at 806.
36. Id. The taxpayers could not have actually relied on the holding in
Turner because the relevant events occurred four years before Turner was
decided.
37. Factually, in Turner the donor required the donees to pay the gift tax
while in Johnson there was no such condition upon the recipt of the gift. Legally,
the taxpayers in Johnson had no reserved interest in the trust corpus while in
Turner there was a reserved interest. Id. at 812.
38. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
39. The Tax Court stated:
We hold that the transfers in question constituted in part a gift and in
part a sale. To the extent that the fair market value of the stock transfer-
red . . . exceeded the amount of his loan it was a gift subject only to the
payment by him of the gift taxes thereon, which have been paid and are
not an issue herein. To the extent the transfers were subject to the loans
they were sales and petitioners each realized capital gains in the amount
his loan exceeded his basis in the stock.
59 T.C. at 812.
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on what it considered to be the substance of the transaction. 0 In
essence, $500,000 worth of stock was exchanged for $200,000 in
cash of which $150,000 was used to pay the gift tax. The court
advanced three bases, any one of which could support the deci-
sion reached by the Tax Court. Under the first, the taxpayer is
seen to have received something of value in exchange for the
transfer of stock in the form of payment of the gift tax."' This
value constitutes income under section 61 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which broadly defines gross income as "all in-
come from whatever source derived .... "" The second combines
section 2502(d) of the Tax Code43 and the principles of Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Commissioner." Section 2502(d) makes payment of
the gift tax the donor's legal obligation; 5 under Old Colony Trust
"[tlhe discharge by a third party of an obligation to him is
equivalent to receipt by the taxed person." 6 Combining these
two principles, the donee's gift tax payment discharges the
donor of his tax liability and thus the gift tax paid is effectively
income to the donor." The third basis focuses on the taxpayer's
shedding of his loan obligation by transferring the stock into a
trust and having the trust cancel his debt using the trust corpus
as security for the new debt.48 Believing that the transactions fall
within the boundaries of Crane v. Commissioner, the court con-
cluded that the taxpayer realized income when he disposed of
the debt; the amount realized being equal to the amount of the
loan. 49
40. 495 F.2d at 1082. The court stated:
The substance of a transaction rather than its form must ultimately deter-
mine the tax liabilities of individuals .... When one overall transaction
transferring property is carried out through a series of closely related
steps, courts have looked to the essential nature of the transaction rather
than to each separate step to determine tax consequences of the transfer.
Id. (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 1083. In this instance, the taxpayer ended up with $200,000 free
of any obligation to repay.
42. Id.
43. I.R.C. § 2502(d).
44. 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (an employer's payment of his employee's income
tax is recognized as income to the employee).
45. Conceivably, the donee could be liable for payment of the gift tax if the
donor refuses to pay it and the IRS elects to force payment by the donee rather
than the donor. I.R.C. § 6324(b).
46. 279 U.S. at 729.
47. 495 F.2d at 1083.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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The Johnson majority criticized the Turner approach of rely-
ing on the donor's intent to distinguish between a gift and a sale,
especially in view of the resulting tax implications when intent
to make a gift is found. The court stated: "It is better to apply
the Tax Code equitably to basically similar transactions than to
impose different results depending on a hindsight determination
of 'actual intent'.""0 The court asserted that the principles of
Turner lie in a "maze of cases" none of which had considered the
argument made by the Commissioner in Johnson that certain
amounts should be taxed based on principles other than section
677 of the Tax Code." The court ended with the unclear state-
ment that "Turner has no precedential value beyond its peculiar
fact situation. '"52
Continuing his line of attack, the Commissioner has recently
prevailed in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In
Diedrich v. Commissioner,3 the court stated that Turner and its
progeny were incorrect and that Johnson is the correct ap-
proach.' In Diedrich, the donor made a gift of low basis, highly
appreciated stock to a family member on the express condition
that the donee would pay all the resulting gift taxes. The Com-
missioner claimed that the taxpayer received a real and substan-
tial economic benefit resulting in a taxable accretion to wealth.55
Stating that it is insignificant that Johnson involved pre-
existing encumbrances, the court focused on what it viewed as a
constructive receipt of income by the taxpayer-donor. 5 The court
reasoned that it makes no difference whether the taxpayer
50. Id. at 1082-83 n.6.
51. Id. at 1085.
52. Id. at 1086.
53. 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 433 (1979), rev'd, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1981).
54. 643 F.2d at 502. The court also cited Estate of Levine v. Commissioner,
72 T.C. 780 (1979), affd, 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980) for additional support. In
Levine, the taxpayer made a gift of real estate encumbered by a non-recourse
mortgage to a trust for his children. The trust assumed the mortgage plus
other additional expenses associated with the real estate. Relying on Crane, see
supra note 38, and Old Colony Trust, see supra note 44, the court held that the
donor realized a taxable gain. 634 F.2d at 14-16.
55. 643 F.2d at 500.
56. The taxpayer unsuccessfully tried to distinguish Johnson on two points.
First, that Johnson must be limited to its own facts because the tax court has
not followed it in subsequent pure net gift cases. Second, the taxpayer in
Johnson personally realized a portion of the appreciated stock while in Diedrich
the donee's agreement to pay the gift tax doesn't arise but for the net gift. Id.
at 503.
[Vol. 20:463
1982]
receives the benefit in the form of relief from tax liability or en-
cumbrance, or whether the liability arose before or at the same
time as the transfer. In either case, the taxpayer received a
benefit that is taxable." Moreover, the court held that the
donor's intent cannot eliminate the economic realities of the trans-
action.'
C. Hybrid Approach
Both Turner and Johnson are Sixth Circuit decisions. It is
unclear from the language of Johnson whether it completely
overruled Turner and it is also unclear which of the two views
represented by these cases is the correct one in determining the
tax consequences. In Hirst v. Commissioner," the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals attempted to reconcile the dichotomy and in
doing so developed an approach that combines elements of both
the intent and economic benefit approaches.
In Hirst, the taxpayer gave her son land on the condition that
he pay the resulting gift tax. The Commissioner claimed a defi-
ciency but the Tax Court held that Turner still controlled the
outcome under these facts and that the transactions in Hirst
were a net gift.' As a result, the court found no taxable gain to
the taxpayer." The Tax Court conceded that there was merit to
the Commissioner's argument that the transaction resulted in
taxable income," but was unwilling to overrule its past decisions,
especially because the transactions in Turner and Hirst were so
similar. The court stated: "Things have gone too far by now to
wipe the slate clean and start all over again," with obvious
reference to Turner and its progeny.'
57. Id. at 504.
58. Id. See 52 TEMP. L. REV. 139, 151 (1979).
59. 63 T.C. 307 (1974), aff'd, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
60. 63 T.C. at 314-15.
61. Id. at 315.
62. The Tax Court stated:
[T]here can be no reasonable dispute that liability for the gift tax is placed
by statute primarily upon the donor, section 2502(d) of the 1954 Code, and
that payment of the tax by the donee must be regarded as discharging
that liability of the donor. Moreover, the discharge of a solvent taxpayer's
liability is ordinarily regarded as conferring a benefit upon him which
may furnish the basis for taking it into account in the computation of tax-
able income.
63 T.C. at 310.
63. Id. at 315.
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court ruling
and agreed that Turner rather than Johnson controlled.14 In do-
ing so, the court followed a hybrid approach. The court
distinguished Johnson as involving a pre-transfer draw-down"5 of
a portion of the appreciated value of transferred asset's. None of
the money was committed to pay the gift tax. As a result of the
trustee's repayment of the taxpayer's loan, the taxpayer had
$200,000 to do with as he pleased. Thus the taxpayer had received
some economic benefit. In Hirst, the court concluded that the
donor "was not better off after the transfer, with the donee
undertaking the burden of the gift tax; she was simply not worse
off."66 The donor had owed nothing before the transaction and
had received nothing because of it. 7 The only gain the donor ac-
crued was release from the real estate tax liabilities due on the
unproductive property 8 that was the subject of the gift. The
court felt that this was not the type of economic benefit that
would result in income tax consequences. 9
The court of appeals agreed that generally the discharge of a
debt is viewed as income, but added that the rule is not univer-
sal. The relationship of the parties and the existence of other
obligations should also be considered."0 The entire circumstances
of the transaction should be examined to determine the true in-
tent of the donor to make either a sale or gift. In light of the
non-commercial, familial nature of the transaction and the fact
that the donor never actually received funds to pay the gift tax,
the court concluded that the taxpayer intended to make a gift,
not a sale, to her children.71 The majority closed by stating that
64. On appeal, a three judge panel held 2 to 1 to reverse the tax court deci-
sion. However, after a rehearing en banc, the court sustained the taxpayer's
position in a 4-3 decision. 572 F.2d at 427-28.
65. By pre-transfer draw-down the court means to say that the donor, by
borrowing against the appreciated value of the stock, had actually reduced the
remaining value of the stock because its new value was equal to its appreciated
value less the amount of the loan.
66. 572 F.2d at 431.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 430.
69. Id. at 430 n.9.
70. Id. at 431. The court gave the example of when a son borrows money
from a bank and his father pays off the loan without charging the son. The pay-
ment by the father is not taxable to the son but rather, is a gift. Id. But see in-
fra note 84.
71. 572 F.2d at 432.
[Vol. 20:463
although Johnson limited Turner, it never explicitly overruled it
and thus Turner is still good law for an identical fact situation."
In a vehement dissent, Senior District Judge Thomsen admitted
that the facts in Turner and Hirst were similiar but concluded
that Turner is simply wrong. He stated that the characterization
of a transaction as a net gift does not preclude treating it as a tax-
able event for income tax purposes." Judge Thomsen explained
that the Sixth Circuit in Johnson based its ruling on the fact that
the gift tax is a legal obligation of the donor and its discharge by
the trust is equivalent to a receipt of income by the donor.74 The
substance of the transaction determines the ultimate tax
liabilities and here, in substance, the donor received an amount
equal to the gift tax in exchange for the property. He concluded
that the result of the transaction is no different than if the donee
had actually paid money directly to the donor." Judge Thomsen
72. Id. at 434. Note that the Fourth Circuit in Hirst felt compelled to
follow the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Turner even though it was not required to
do so.
There is a question as to the status of Turner after Johnson. Though Johnson
appears to overrule Turner it never expressly states so. Keying on the non-
explicit language and the "intricate and consistent pattern of decisions" the
Hirst tax court concluded that Turner is still a viable precedent. 63 T.C. at
314-15. The Fourth Circuit agreed and said that Turner should be followed in a
fact situation similar to Turner. 572 F.2d at 434. It should be noted that what
one court viewed as a consistent line of cases, the Johnson court refers to as a
"maze of cases." 495 F.2d at 1085. The Second Circuit concluded in Levine v.
Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980), that Johnson did overrule Turner and
that Johnson should be followed. Id. at 17.
The Johnson court's statement with respect to Turner can be interpreted in
several ways. First, Turner has continued vitality in a factually similar transac-
tion. Second, Turner's authority remains only when the Commissioner makes
similar arguments and concessions with respect to the transaction and an incon-
sistent result would follow. In Turner, the Commissioner used a part gift, part
sale argument rather than the economic benefit approach and conceded that the
trustees should be treated differently than the individual donees because the
trustees were not personally liable for payment of the tax. The third interpreta-
tion is that Turner is no longer good law. In actuality, the second and third in-
terpretations give the same result because the Commissioner now argues
realization of income resulting from the discharge of a debt and economic
benefit theories. See Johnson, 495 F.2d at 1083. Thus the Fourth and Sixth Cir-
cuits will continue to follow Turner in cases of indistinguishable facts until it is
clearly overruled despite their recognition that the economic benefit rationale
of Johnson is a more realistic approach. But see the strong dissenting opinions
in Hirst, 572 F.2d at 437 (Thomsen, J., dissenting).
73. 572 F.2d at 437 (Thomsen, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 438-39.
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closed by noting that if there is taxable income the result is fair
to both the taxpayer and to the government: No part of the
transaction is taxed twice and no part escapes taxation.6
III. CRANE V. COMMISSIONER AND THE ECONOMIC BENEFIT
APPROACH OF JOHNSON: CHOOSING SUBSTANCE OVER FORM
In developing the intent approach the Turner court relied on
what it believed to be similar but not identical precedent, and on
a belief that a part gift, part sale characterization would lead to
an unacceptable result in computing the donee's new basis in the
gift under the treasury regulations; that is, to a double credit for
the gift tax paid.77 Reliance on either of these appears to be
misplaced. With respect to the precedent, the Johnson court
pointed out that the cases relied on in Turner should not control
because they tested section 677(a) of the Code which is not the
issue under the present circumstances,"8 and because they never
considered the Commissioner's economic benefit approach. With
respect to the double credit the donee will get in determining his
basis in the gift, the Turner court failed to recognize both the
nature of a gift tax and a specific federal statute that allows the
gift tax paid by the donee to be included twice in the basis
calculation .
The gift tax is part of the cost of giving a gift, regardless of
who pays it. The duplication that occurs by including this money
once as the gift tax paid (reflecting the cost to transfer property)
and once as the amount paid by the donee (reflecting the cost of
the property to the donor) is necessary if the new basis is to
reflect the true total cost of the gift. 0 Therefore, neither prece-
76. Id. at 439.
77. Turner, 49 T.C. at 364. A simple illustration of Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4
follows: The donor has property worth $10,000. His basis in the land is $1,000.
He gives the donee the land and the donee in turn pays the gift tax of $3,000
(assumed). Under the part sale rules of section 1.1015-4 (1972), the donee's basis
would be $3,000 (the amount paid by the transferee because it exceeded the
donor's basis) plus $3,000 (the gift tax paid) for a total of $6,000. One would get
the same result if, within a family relationship, a son pays the father $3,000
outright for the $10,000 worth of property and the father pays the $3,000 gift
tax. See Ward, Taxation of Gratuitous Transfers of Encumbered Property: Par-
tial Sales and Section 677(a), 63 IOwA L. REV. 823, 863-64 (1978) [hereinafter
cited was Ward].
78. 495 F.2d at 1085.
79. See I.R.C. § 1015(b), (d); Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-2, -4, -5.
80. S. Rep. N. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News,
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dent nor the fear-of-a-double-credit result supports the Turner
court's application of the intent approach."'
The economic benefit approach developed in Johnson, how-
ever, is supported by a recurring guideline that several of the
courts follow: the substance of the transaction must control over
its form." The intermediate steps that are taken to effect a
desired result are not as important as the result itself when
determining income tax consequences.
With respect to making a gift, the desired result is the
transfer of property as a gift and the payment of the correspond-
ing gift tax. Different types of transactions can affect the same
result. For example, assume that a donor has property worth
$10,000, his adjusted basis is $1,000, and he wants to give the
property to a close family member. Assume further that the gift
tax on an $8,000 gift is $2,000. If the donor gives the donee an
$8,000 gift and sells the remaining $2,000 in property in order to
pay the gift tax, he will realize a $1,000 gain from the sale. As
an alternative, the donor can give the entire $10,000 to the donee
and under the net gift rule the donee will pay $2,000 in gift tax
pp. 4859-60 (1958) which states:
In general, carrying over the basis of property in the case of gifts is in
accord with the general principle followed in determining basis; namely,
setting the basis of the property at its "cost". In this case the "cost" is
the cost of the property to the donor, adjusted for any subsequent
depreciation, etc. However, this ignores the fact that in reality there is
another "cost" incurred in transferring the property from the donor to the
donee; namely, the gift tax, which must be paid in order to make this
transfer. As a result, your committee has concluded that to properly
reflect total "costs" incurred with respect to donated property it is
necessary to increase the basis of the property by the amount of any gift
tax paid with respect to it.
Id. at 4859.
81. In fact, applying the Turner approach adds even more of a tax burden
on the donee. From the example in note 79 supra, if there is a net gift with no
income tax consequences to the donor, there is no money paid for the property
and thus the donee's basis is $3,000. When the property is sold, the donee will
have to pay tax on an additional $3,000 of income.
82. Hirst, 572 F.2d at 432 (citing Commissioner v. Court Holding, 324 U.S.
331, 334 ("The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of the trans-
action.")); Johnson, 495 F.2d at 1082 ("The substance of a transaction rather
than its form must ultimately determine the tax liabilities of individuals.");
Turner, 49 T.C. at 363 ("We are of the opinion that it is the substance rather
than the form of the transfers which must be the decisive factor.").
83. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1001-1(e) (1972) and 1.1015-4 (1973) allow a non-
allocated basis approach so that the donor can use the entire amount of his ad-
justed basis to determine his gain in a part sale, part gift transaction.
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for an $8,000 net gift. The resulting gift of property is identical
in each case; the form of the transaction is different. But the in-
come tax consequences to the donor differ according to what line
of authority is held to control. In the first example, the donor
has $1,000 gain that is to be added to his taxable income, while
in the second example, if the Turner rational is employed, the
net gift results in no gain to the donor. Turner and Hirst would
support this result, relying on a hindsight examination of the
donor's intent. But intent to make a net gift, according to
Johnson, does not determine the true tax consequences or
substance of the transaction.85 Rather, an examination of the
economic effects of the transfers more properly reflect the actual
outcome.
The Johnson court relied in part on Crane v. Commissioner88
in concluding that the economic realities of a gift transaction
should control the income tax consequences. In Crane, a tax-
84. The Turner court essentially determined substance by intent. Hirst did
not go as far. Recognizing the merits of the Commissioner's economic benefit
argument used in the Johnson decision, the Hirst court not only examined the
presumed intent of the parties but also looked at the economic benefits from
the transfer and concluded that the taxpayer received no funds and thus no tax-
able income. 572 F.2d at 432.
To show the importance of the family relationship, the Hirst court gave an
example of a situation where the father pays back a loan obligation of his son.
See supra note 70. The conclusion that the son does not realize any taxable in-
come is correct but the example is distinguishable from the situation with
which we are now dealing. In the example, the father is acting with gratuitous
intent and generosity but in the gift tax situation, the gift itself is conditioned
upon the payment of the gift tax by the transferee, agreed upon in advance.
The payment by the discharging party was in anticipation of a benefit, that is,
receipt of the gift. Thus the gift exception is inapplicable. See Ward, supra note
77, at 865-66; 52 Temp. L. Q. 139, 149 n.72 (1979); 38 MD. L. REV. 110, 118-19
(1978).
85. The term "net gift" is a word of art and is not black letter law. The
concept was developed specifically for determination of gift tax and is not to be
carried over into the determination of income tax. Diedrich, 643 F.2d at 501 n.8.
Similarly, income tax results don't control gift tax results. "[T]he income tax
provisions are not to be construed as though they are in pari materia with the
estate tax law or gift tax statutes." Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160
F.2d 812, 814-15 (2d Cir. 1947). The reduction in the amount of gift tax owed
based on the net gift concept should not preclude the finding of an income tax
consequence. Hirst, 572 F.2d at 437 (Thomsen, J., dissenting). If there is an
economic benefit for the donor as a result of the transfer, the income tax conse-
quences should be examined separately and apart from the gift tax conse-
quences.
86. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
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payer inherited a building subject to a mortgage of $262,042.50
which was also the assessed value of the property for the estate
tax. The taxpayer did not assume the mortgage but instead
made an agreement with the mortgagee whereby she would con-
tinue to operate the inherited property and remit the net rentals
to the mortgagee to cover payment of the mortgage interest.
During the next seven years, the taxpayer reported the gross
rentals as income and was allowed deductions for taxes, operat-
ing expenses, mortgage interest paid, and property depreciation.
The net rentals failed to cover the mortgage interest (thus the
mortgage principal remained the same) and eventually the mort-
gagee threatened foreclosure. As a result, the taxpayer sold the
property for $2500 net cash, subject to the mortgage. In report-
ing her gain on the sale, the taxpayer reasoned that her basis in
the property was her equity interest, or the amount by which
the value of the inherited property exceeded the outstanding
mortgage. Because they were equal, she claimed the basis was
$0. In addition, because the mortgage was never assumed, the
amount realized on the sale was the net cash amount. Thus, she
concluded that gain was $2500 less $0, or $2500.7
Noting that the taxpayer realized substantial benefits through
the depreciation deductions taken in earlier years, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that when the property was sold,
the taxpayer had to include its fair market value (which in this
instance equaled the original value of the mortgage) in determin-
ing her basis and resulting gain." Thus, according to Crane,
when examining the substance of the transaction and its
economic realities, the critical inquiry is whether some economic
benefit or something of value was received by the donor. Similarly
in the gift situation the question becomes whether payment of
the gift tax by the donee constitutes such a recognizable benefit
to the donor.
Gift tax is the price a donor must pay in order to pass part of
his estate to another party. If there is no transfer prior to death,
the property will pass through his estate and be subject to
estate tax.89 Hence, the tax scheme imposes some monetary
obligation on the donor (or his estate) when property is trans-
87. Id. at 3-4.
88. Id. at 11-13.
89. I.R.C. § 2001.
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ferred. If the donor can avoid paying the gift tax by shifting its
burden to the donee or trustee, the donor has essentially passed
his property without incurring any tax liability himself.
Economically and substantively, the donor has received an
economic benefit." In instances such as Johnson where property
is encumbered prior to placing it in trust and the trust subse-
quently assumes the encumbrance, the economic benefit is even
more apparent because the donor is able to acquire part of the
appreciated value of the property. When his obligation to repay
the loan is cancelled by the trust assuming the debt, the tax-
payer has received a pecuniary benefit regardless of whether he
is personally liable on the encumbrance. 9
The donee' payment of a gift tax is an economic benefit to the
donor. However, because Crane dealt exclusively with mort-
gaged property, its use as authority for deciding the income tax
consequences in gift tax cases for the donor has raised two ques-
tions: first, whether Crane should be applied to gift transactions
as well as to sales; second, whether the gift tax liability that
arises at the time the gift is made can be equated with a pre-
existing encumbrance.
Given the more recent decision in Johnson, the first question
is answered in the affirmative. The Johnson court refused to
make a distinction between part gift, part sale and net gift and
thus applied the doctrine regardless of the characterization of
the transaction.92 With respect to the second question, it is the
fact that an obligation has been discharged that is significant,
not when the obligation was created with respect to its
discharge. The Johnson court, which dealt with shedding a debt
by transferring encumbered stock, specifically stated that the ap-
plication of the principles in Crane mandated a finding that the
donee's payment of the gift tax liability constitutes income to the
donor.93 Thus, cases involving income tax liabilities resulting
90. The benefit is the difference between the gift tax paid by the donee
and the donor's adjusted basis in the transferred property.
91. In Crane, the Supreme Court ruled that when encumbered property is
sold, the amount realized on the sale includes any liability that is sold along
with the property even if the seller is not personally liable for the encum-
brance. 331 U.S. at 13-14.
92. Johnson, 495 F.2d at 1083.
93. Id. See 52 TEMP. L.Q. 139, 150 (1979). But see Hirst, 572 F.2d at 431.
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from the donee paying the gift tax fall within the boundaries of
Crane .
Although it is conceptually difficult to see economic benefit in
a gift situation when no money actually changes hands between
the donor and donee, payment of the gift tax is primarily the
donor's legal obligation,95 and Od Colony Trust equates the
discharge of this obligation with receipt by the donor of an
equivalent amount of income.96 The donor has constructively
received taxable income." Although it would be easy to see that
there is an economic benefit if there is an actual sale of property,
the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Bruun9" has made it clear
that a realization of gain "may occur as a result of exchange of
property, payment of the taxpayer's indebtedness, relief from a
liability, or other profit realized from the completion of a trans-
action.""
The court in Hirst attempted to use an economic benefit ap-
proach but its analysis demonstrated a basic misunderstanding
of the realization of gain concept developed in Helvering. ° The
court did examine the transaction to see from where the money
was coming and to where it was going, but then concluded that
the donor was no better off after the transactions than before.
The court found that the donor did not intend to sell anything
but rather intended to make a gift. 1 ' It failed to recognize the
critical point that a sale is not required for there to be a relief
from a liability and a corresponding economic gain. That there
was a close family relationship and intent to make a gift cannot
94. Johnson, 495 F.2d at 1083. For additional discussion of the scope of
Crane, see Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine; An
Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REV. 159, 166-70 (1965); Bacas,
Gifts of Property Subject to Indebtedness; Johnson v. Commissioner, 44 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 86 (1975); Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A
Current View of Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
69 (1969).
95. I.R.C. § 2502(d). See supra note 1.
96. Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 729.
97. This doctrine of "constructive receipt" is the exact argument advanced
by Judge Thomsen in the dissenting opinion of Hirst, 572 F.2d at 438 (Thomsen,
J., dissenting).
98. 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
99. Id. at 469.
100. See 38 MD. L. REV. 110, 117 (1978).
101. Hirst, 572 F.2d at 430 n.9, 431.
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negate the economic reality that the donor received a measur-
able benefit when the donee assumed the gift tax liability.' °2 As
the Johnson court stated, the Tax Code should be applied in the
same way to similiar transactions. 3 Granted, the form of the
transaction may be different, but if the result is the same, then
the tax consequences should be the same regardless of intent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Policy considerations favor the application of Crane in relief
from gift tax situations. Because the taxpayer is enjoying the
benefit of passing the property to one he chooses, he should also
bear the tax burden. In fact, an inequity arises when the donee
must bear the tax burden upon his sale of the appreciated prop-
erty on gains that were actually received by the donor. In addi-
tion, reliance on Crane in conjunction with the holdings of Old
Colony Trust and Helvering will create consistency and predict-
ability.104 If the economic benefit approach is used, similarly
resulting transactions, though formally different, will be treated
102. The close family relationship is a factor that is to be considered when
determining whether the transfer is indeed a gift to the donee because if it is a
gift, it is not included as income to the donee. See I.R.C. § 102.
103. Johnson, 495 F.2d at 1082-83 n.6.
104. Old Colony Trust is premised on the fact that the debt is the obligation
of the party being credited with the discharge rather than the debt of the party
paying the debt. The question arises with respect to gift tax about whether the
payment of the gift tax liability by the donee primarily benefits the donor. If
the gift tax is not paid when due, the donee can be held personally responsible
for its payment to the extent of the value of the gift. I.R.C. §§ 6901(a)(A)(iii),
6324(b). The government can recover the tax from-the donor or donee and if it
is recovered from the donee, he is not entitled to reimbursement from the
donor. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Anthony, 13 N.J. Super. 596, 608-09, 81 A.2d
191, 198 (Ch. Div. 1951), affd, 18 N.J. Super. 49, 86 A.2d 594 (App. Div. 1952).
Thus, in actuality, the government can affix the ultimate tax burden by choos-
ing which party against whom to proceed. Arguably, it follows that the donee's
payment really relieves the possibility that the donor would have to pay the
gift tax. Nevertheless, the present policy of the Internal Revenue Service is to
proceed first against the donor if there is a gift tax deficiency. I.R.C. § 2502(d)
requires that the donor pay the gift tax and it is reasonable to assume that he
will pay his statutory liability. In addition, the donee could not be held liable
for the tax until it becomes due. Therefore, if the donee pays the gift tax before
it is due, he is discharging a liability that up to that point in time is solely the
responsibility of the donor. As a result, the donor does receive the primary
benefit when the donee pays the gift tax and this payment constitutes a taxable
benefit to the donor under Johnson. For a more detailed discussion of the
donor/donee tax liability, see Ward, supra note 77, at 859-61.
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equally."°5 As stated in Johnson; "[W]e find no basis whatsoever
in the provisions of the Code for taxpayer's assertion that a
donee's discharge of a donor's gift tax liability does not con-
stitute the realization of income if a donor's tax attorneys struc-
ture the transactions in a certain manner."'0 6
Andrew C. Siminerio
105. The tax liability resulting from the discharge of income tax liability
(Old Colony Trust) would not differ from the discharge of a gift tax liability
(Turner and Hirst) merely because the former involves an employer-employee
relationship and the latter has a parent-child relationship.
106. 495 F.2d at 1084.

